Sir, second-pass audit completed **read-only**. Verdict:

**No — OpenClaw is not “beschnitten enough to avoid damage” if exposed to untrusted users/input.**
For *your single-user trusted-assistant setup* it is workable, but it is powerful and currently not tightly sandboxed. In short: excellent butler, loaded revolver in the umbrella stand.

**Evidence / settings**

- **Gateway**
  - Config: `/home/agent/.openclaw/openclaw.json`
  - `gateway.auth.mode = token`
  - `gateway.mode = local`
  - `gateway.bind = lan`
  - `gateway.port = 18789`
  - Runtime listener: `0.0.0.0:18789`
  - Tailscale exposure: off
  - Risk: despite “local mode”, bind is LAN-wide, not loopback-only.

- **Autostart / background**
  - `openclaw-gateway.service` exists, enabled, running.
  - `hermes-gateway.service` exists, enabled, running.
  - OpenClaw Gateway process:
    - `/usr/bin/node ... openclaw/dist/index.js gateway --port 18789`
  - Hermes Gateway process:
    - `python -m hermes_cli.main gateway run --replace`

- **Security audit result**
  - `openclaw security audit`: **1 critical, 6 warnings**
  - Critical:
    - Telegram group commands have no sender allowlist.
    - `groups.*.requireMention = true`, but no group `allowFrom`.
  - Warnings include:
    - No gateway auth rate limiting.
    - Potential multi-user setup.
    - Runtime/process tools exposed without full sandboxing.
    - `agents.defaults`: `sandbox=off`; runtime tools include `exec/process`; filesystem tools include `read/write/edit/apply_patch`; `fs.workspaceOnly=false`.
    - Extension plugins exist but `plugins.allow` is not set.
    - Browser control enabled.

- **Telegram**
  - DM policy: `allowlist`
  - DM `allowFrom`: only `1344779884`
  - Group policy risk remains because group sender allowlist is missing.

- **Plugins enabled**
  - Enabled in `openclaw.json`:
    - `brave`
    - `openrouter`
    - `lossless-claw`
    - `ollama`
    - `memory-core`
    - `openai`
  - Many optional skills are explicitly disabled.
  - Missing: explicit `plugins.allow` allowlist.

- **Mutation capability**
  - This session/tooling has:
    - shell/exec/process access
    - file read/write/edit/apply_patch
    - browser control
    - messaging via Telegram
    - elevated execution visible in session status
  - So damage potential is real if prompt-injected or exposed.

- **Hermes / Qwen**
  - Hermes has its own gateway running.
  - Qwen is directly reachable via:
    - `http://100.101.173.25:11435/v1`
    - model: `qwen-3.6-agent`
  - **Yes, Hermes can call Qwen directly without OpenClaw**, via its custom provider / OpenAI-compatible endpoint.
  - OpenClaw is not required as a proxy for Qwen.

**Bottom line**

For a private single-operator assistant: **acceptable but permissive**.
For anything multi-user, group-chat exposed, or hostile-input-facing: **not restricted enough**.

Major fixes would be: bind gateway to loopback or tailnet-only, add auth rate limits, add Telegram group sender allowlist, enable stricter sandbox/workspace-only FS, set explicit plugin allowlist, and restrict high-impact tools where not needed.